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Comments
FUTURE INTERESTS-MISSOURI LAW OF LIMITATIONS TO THE GRANTOR'S OR
DEVISOR'S HEIRS
Where there was a limitation to the heirs of a grantor or devisor under the
common law, the courts held that that limitation was of no effect to give an estate
to heirs by purchase, and that there was a reversion in the grantor himself.'
This resulted in the heirs of the grantor or devisor taking, if at all, by inheritance
rather than by purchase. The interest of the heirs was no greater than a bare
expectancy subject to defeasance by the ancestor's disposition of the property
before his death. This rule is commonly referred to as the rule in Bingham's
Cases having taken its name from the case title of one of the earliest English
cases applying the doctrine.:3
The foundation for the doctrine's application under our present system of
property law is generally conceded by writers and courts to be based upon his-
torical reasons which are nonexistent at the present time.4 One of the primary
bases for the original creation of the rule is the feudal law of primogeniture.
Courts used the rule in Bingham's Case as an effective means of preserving the
overlord's feudal incidents of wardship and marriage.5 As a result of the- ex-
tirpation of feudalism and the feudalistic incidents appertaining thereto, the
doctrine lost its basic support- Another reason under the common law for the
rule was that devisees were not liable for the debts of the devisor, not even
for specialty debts,6 unless the realty was expressly charged with the payment
of debts by the will of the testator.7 However, a decedent's intestate property
was subject to the payment of his debts. The rule in Bingham's Case permitted
the decedent's creditors to proceed against his realty even though he purported
to pass some interest to his heirs by will, thus avoiding the common law re-
strictions in the case -of devisee. The decedent's heirs were held to take by
inheritance, if at all, as it was said: "A devise to the heir at law is void, if it
gives precisely the same estate that the heir would take by descent if the particular
devise to him was omitted out of the will." s In view of modern lay. -, I jecting
all of a decedent's property to the payment of his debts before dev . -s are
permitted to take, the historical basis for the protection of a decedent's creditors
1. Ellis v. Page, 7 Cush. 161 (Mass. 1851).
2. 2 Co. Rep. 91a (K. B. 1600).
3. The historical development of the doctrine has been dealt with by
Harper and Heckel, The Doctrine of Worthier Title (1930), 24 ILL. L. REv. 627,
4. Harper and Heckel, supra note 3; 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §§
144, 145.
5. Ibid.
6. Plasket v. Beeby, 4 East 485 (K. B. 1804).
7. Greene v. Greene, 4 Madd. 148 (Ch. 1819).
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has been nullified. Another purported reason offered by courts as a basis for
the rule has been that it serves as a means of preserving family pride, for a
title derived by descent is a worthier title than one acquired by purchase. This
also accounts for its present descriptive reference of "worthier title" as employed
by courts and writers. This was not an original reason advanced for the creation
of the doctrine, but was rather a rationalization of the rule by courts when
petitioned to invoke the doctrine in an appropriate case.
Irrespective of modern reason or necessity, the doctrine of worthier title is a
well established common law principle of property and future interest law.9 Un-
der the early common law conception of the doctrine it was a positive rule of law
which often had the effect of defeating the grantor's or devisor's intent, rather
than a rebuttable rule of construction to aid in the determination of that intent.
In England by virtue of its statutory abrogation,", the doctrine of worthier title
has no application either as a positive rule or as a rule of construction. American
courts have not followed the doctrine in its strictest application as a positive rule
of law but have generally accorded it the status of a rule of construction.". The
rule of construction deducible from American decisions is that where the heir
of the grantor or devisor would take the same quality and quantity of estate by
descent as he would take by purchase, if the particular limitation were omitted
from the instrument, the heir is held to take by descent the worthier title.
American courts have not repudiated the doctrine by judicial decision, save in
one or two cases of doubtful authority.
12
Due to the superficial similarity of the factual situations wherein the doctrine
of worthier title and the rule in Shelley's Casea are applicable, the two situations
must be distinguished. This note deals with the type situation where A grants or
devises to B for life, then to the heirs of A. The rule in Shelley's Case concerns
the situation where A grants or devises to B for life, then to the heirs of B. Though
the two rules are distinct, courts often confuse them in their application.' 4 Un-
der the English common law, the rule in Shelley's Case was followed as a positive
rule of law.15 American courts have generally accorded the rule in Shelley's Case
the effect of a positive rule of :aw which almost always defeats the intent of the
grantor or devisor.' Statutes abrogating the rule in Shelley's Case have no effect
9. Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919); Akers v. Clark,
184 I1. 136, 56 N. E. 296 (1900); Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88 (1817);
Parsons v. Winslow, 16 Mass. 361 (1820); Ellis v. Page, 7 Cush. 161 (Mass.
1851).
10. Inheritance Act, 1833, 3 & 4 W,%r. IV, c. 106, § 3.
11. Bowditch v. Jordan, 131 Mass. 321 (1881) ; Dooley . Goodwin, 93 S. W.
47 (Ky. 1906); Hammond v. Chemung Canal Trust Co., 141 N. Y. Misc. 158,
252 N. Y. Supp. 259 (1931) ; Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 154 Pac. 306
(1915); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 Ill. 248, 54 N. E. 918 (1899); see Doctor v.
Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 311, 122 N. E. 221, 222 (1919) ; Whittemore v. Equitable
Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
12. In re Merritt, 94 N. Y. Misc. 425, 159 N. Y. Supp. 558 (1916) ; Sands v.
Old Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575 (1907).
13. 1 Co. Rep. 93b (K. B. 1581).
14. Loring v. Eliot, 82 Mass. 568 (1860).
15. Jesson v. Wright, 2 Bligh 1 (H. L. 1820).
16. Hudson v. Hudson, 287 Ill. 286, 122 N. E.,497 (1919); Hicks v. Deemer,
2
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on the application of the doctrine of worthier title.'- Missouri has a statute
abolishing the rule in Shelley's Case in regard to limitations in deeds.' 8 The
Missouri statute purporting to abolish the rule of Shelley's Case in its application
to wills is curiously drawn, and perhaps from a literal interpretation fails in its
purpose.1'
Due to the scanty judicial construction of the doctrine of worthier title in
Missouri cases, this note attempts to review not only those cases where the ap-
plication of the doctrine was directly inm-issue, but also those cases wherein the
facts would have warranted an analysis of the doctrine's applicability had the
issue been raised. Following a chronological order, the case of Tevis v. Tevis2O
presents this factual situation: A devised blackacre to B for life of X, with the
right in B to purchase said land, and then the money or land to heirs of body of
X, or if none, to A's heirs at law. B, the plaintiff, elected to purchase the land,
and seeks to secure the title and his share of purchase money, claiming to come
within the meaning of A's heirs at law, as X died without bodily issue. C, D, E, F
are residuary legatees or devisees who together with B constitute A's heirs at law.
The court construed the limitation to A's heirs at law as creating in B, and in the
residuary legatees, C, D, E, F, a remainder contingent on surviving the termina-
tion of life estate. Although F survived A, he died prior to the termination of B's
life estate, hence the surviving members of the class took the entire interest,
Assuming this construction to be proper, there would be no occasion for the ap-
plication of the doctrine of worthier title as the "heirs at law" of A did not refer
to legal heirs of A at the time of his natural death, but rather to those persons
who .were A's heirs had A died at the termination of B's life estate. Although
there was no issue raised as to an application of the doctrine of worthier title,
had the court invoked the doctrine, B would have taken no share of the purchase
money and the residuary legatees would have acquired the entire interest. If
the devise to the heirs at law of A was "oid, A would have retained the re-
versionary interest, which would have passed under the residuary clause of his
will. However, this case held that where a testator devises to his heirs at law
intending that they be determined as a class at a time other than his death, that
intent will be given effect.
In the case of Wells v. Kuhn,2" A conveyed blackacre to B for life, then to A,
but if A predeceases B, then to descend and vest in heirs of A. Subsequently
A conveyed all of his interest to B. A predeceased B and the collateral heirs of A
seek to set aside the second deed on the theory that A had nothing left to convey
by the second deed, as his first deed passed a life estate to B and contingent re-
mainder in fee to the heirs of A.- " The court construed the words "heirs at law
187 I1. 164, 58 N. E. 252 (1900) ; Kirby v. Broaddus, 94 Kan. 48, 145 Pac. 875(1915).
17. Mayes v. Kuykendall, 112 S. W. 673 (Ky. 1908).
18. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3110.
19. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 562.
20. 259 Mo. 19, 167 S. W. 1003 (1914).
21. 221 S. W. 19 (Mo. 1920).
22. Had this construction of the limitation been adopted by the court
the result contended for by the heirs of A would not necessarily have followed. 3
et al.: Comments
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of A" as words of limitation and not of purchase, and held that A retained the
reversion in fee, and his heirs, if they take, must take by descent. 23 The parties
claiming through B took the entire interest. The court did not employ the theory
of the doctrine of worthier title, but adopted the construction of the word "heirs"
as laid down in Garrett v. Wiltse,24 asseverating that "Undoubtedly the words
'and heirs' may be used in deeds and wills in the sense of sons, daughters and
children, etc., that is, as words of purchase, when the context demands such
construction, but the burden is thrown upon him who contends they are words
of purchase to rebut the presumption that they are used as words of limitation,
i.e., as intended to mean not individuals but quantity of estate and descent,
which in a fixed legal sense they import, and the intent not to use the words in
their legal and fixed sense must be unequivocal and not to be misunderstood."
By inference the court purports to follow the rule that where there is a limitation
in favor of the heirs of the grantor, the court will presume, in the absence of any
contrary intent of grantor being shown, the words are not used as words of pur-
chase indicating a particular class to take under the instrument, but rather
as words of limitation describing the quality of the preceding estate limited.
Factually, however, it was unnecessary for the court to invoke this rule of con-
struction. The instrument displayed the grantor's intent clearly and un-
equivocally, that being, that the land "shall descend and vest in his heirs." The
language clearly indicates that the heirs were to acquire title by descent, if at
all. The cardinal principle in the interpretation of deeds is that the intent of the
grantor shall be the governing factor. Courts do not invoke rules of con-
struction as distinguished from rules of interpretation 25 unless the intention of
the grantor is unknown and undiscoverable. The dictum of the court to the
effect that the heirs of the grantor are presumed to take by descent rather than
by purchase, in the absence of any contrary intent of the grantor being shown,
is in accord with the general weight of authority in the United States as to the
application of the doctrine of worthier title.2';
The grantor would have retained a reversionary interest after the creation of
the contingent remainder. The issue that would have squarely arisen would
have been whether or not the Missouri courts would adhere to the common law
principles of destructibility of contingent remainders. If we assume that the court
would have followed those principles, then, the reversionary interest and the
next vested interest having come together in the same person, the two interests
would merge and swallow up the particular estate. There being no particular
estate to support the contingent remainder, it would be destroyed. The ultimate
result of the case would have been the same.
23. A related problem, though not within the doctrine of worthier title, may
arise from a factual situation wherein A conveys to B iir life, then to B's
children, but if none, then to A and his heirs. Hobbs v. Yeager, 263 S. W. 225
(Mo. 1924); Keller v. Keller, 92 S. W. (2d) 157 (Mo. 1936). Courts generally
hold that A has expressly retained a defeasible reversionary interest after the
contingent remainder.
24. 252 Mo. 699, 710, 161 S. W. 694 (1913). The issue raised in this case
as to the construction of the word "heirs" was entirely unrelated to the doctrine
of worthier title. The problem raised was whether "heirs" was used to describe
the quality of the estate the grantee acquired or was used to create an interest
in the heirs of the grantee by purchase.
25. ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) § 265.
26. See note 11, szpra.
19:4o01
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The reasons, meritorious or otherwise, for the application of the doctrine
of worthier title have no foundation in cases involving personalty.27 Personal
property was never held in feudal tenure, so that any necessity for the invocation
of the doctrine to protect feudal rights of an overlord was nonexistent. The
creditors of the decedent have always been able to proceed against the decedent's
personalty, whether it was bequeathed or inherited. Under common law prin-
ciples personalty passed to the next of kin and did not pass by descent.29 Never-
theless, some American courts have misconstrued the scope of the doctrine's
application and have failed to restrict its application to cases involving realty. 2"
In Gardner v. Vanlandingham,3o A bequeathed the residue of his estate to
B for life, then to A's heirs, but if any die, his share to go to his issue. A had
five heirs, C, D, E, F, G, living at his death. Between the date of A's death and B's
death C and D had died. Plaintiffs claimed through C and D. E, F and G had
acquired possession of the residue of the estate, which consisted entirely of per-
sonalty. As defendants, they contended that they had acquired the entire interest
as the remainder created in A's heirs was contingent on surviving B. The court
adopted the plaintiffs construction of the limitation that the heirs' interest vested
at the death of A. The remaining limitation created a contingent executory
interest which would devest the title of such of these remaindermen who should
die with issue prior to the death of B. Since neither C or D died with issue, the
court held that their interest could not be devested, and their-vested interests were
transmitted to their legal representatives. There was no contention raised that
the heirs of A took by descent rather than by purchase, though the application
of the rule would have changed the ultimate result. By statut(-in Missouri,31 a
widow takes a child's share of personalty if her husband dies intestate and with
children. Had the property gone by descent, A's widow would have taken a share,
and the distribution would have been made in sixths rather than in fifths. Al-
though the issue was not raised, the result (as distinguished from the reasoning)
of this case is authority, when the appropriate case arises, for the holding that
the doctrine of worthier title does not apply to cases involving personalty.
In Fullerton v. Fullerton,3 - A in his will created a trust fund to consist of
$2,000 with the additional sum that may be derived from the sale of lands that
he owned. The trustee was directed to loan the fund on ample real estate
security, the interest to be paid annually to B for life, then the principal to go to
B's children, but in case B dies without children surviving him, then the principal
to go to A's heirs. The will created a life estate in B, and alternative contingent
remainders in B's surviving children and in A's heirs, and a reversion in A's estate.
As the will was not set out in its entirety, we may only speculate as to whom the
reversionary interest passed. If the will contained a residuary clause, the re-
27. Ellis v. Page, 7 Cush. 161 (Mass. 1851) ; Biedler v. Biedler, 87 Va. 300
(1891) semble.
28. ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) §§ 7, 8.
29. See Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433 (1891).
30. 334 Mo. 1054, 69 S. W. (2d) 947 (1934).
31. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 323.
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version would have passed to the residuary legatees. Conversely, if there were no
residuary clause, the reversionary interest was acquired by A's next of kin.
There was no contention raised for the application of the doctrine of
worthier title to the purported remainder created in the heirs of A. Even those
courts which apply the doctrine of worthier title in cases dealing with personalty
must limit its operation to wills or deeds in which the testator or grantor purports
to create a remainder in his next of kin. A limited the remainder to his "heirs,"
and if A intended to create a remainder in his strict heirs, there could be no
application of the doctrine of worthier title, as those who comprise the class of
A's heirs are not the same persons as those who constitute the class of A's next of
kin. If it can be construed that the testator meant "next of kin" when he used
"heirs," then the issue arises whether the doctrine of worthier title should
apply.33 If the doctrine of worthier title had been applied giving A a reversion
instead of creating a remainder in A's heirs, when B died without issue him
surviving, this reversion would have fallen into the residuary clause, or if none,
would have passed to A's next of kin.
The court said in the principal case that ". the remainder would
descend to the heirs . . ." of A.34 Though the ultimate result is certainly
justified, the court's language that the heirs took a remainder by descent is in-
consistent in theory. If the heirs acquired a remainder, they would take that
interest by purchase. If they acquired an interest by descent, they are not taking
a remainder, but rather a reversion from the testator. If the court really means
the heirs took by descent, the court must have unconsciously applied the doctrine
of worthier title to personalty. For the heirs to take by descent, the will would
have to be without a residuary clause, as pointed out above. In any. event,
the precise holding of the case is consistent with the previous decision of the
court in Gardner v. Vanlandingham.
In the recent case of Norman v. Horton,35 A conveyed to B for life, remainder
to heirs of the body of B, but if none survive B, then to the heirs of A. Defendants
contended that the future interest given to the heirs of A was a reversionary
interest, invoking the doctrin, of worthier title, but if a remainder were created,
it vested on the death of A Either construction of the limitation that the de-
fendants contended for would have given the same ultimate result. In adopting
the plaintiffs contention that the interest of A's "heirs" was a remainder con-
tingent on their surviving B's death, the court followed the same construction of
the limitation to the testator's heirs as did the court in Tevis v. Tevis. If A's
heirs were to be determined as though A had died immediately after B, there would
be no occasion for the application of the doctrine of worthier title, for the
33. Intestate personal property is distributed to a man's "next of kin." In-
testate real estate descends to "heirs." It is not uncommon, however, for laymen
and lawyers to speak loosely of personal property being distributed to "heirs."
Hence when a testator bequeathes personalty to "heirs," courts often construe
those words to mean "next of kin." McCormick v. Sanford, 318 Ill. 544, 149 N. E.
476 (1925); Jacobs v. Prescott, 102 Me. 63. 65 At. 761 (1906); Lawrence v.
Crane, 158 Mass. 392, 33 N. E. 605 (1893). 2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936)§ 420.
34. Italics added.
35. 126 S. W. (2d) 187 (Mo. 1939).
1:9401
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interest would be limited to an entirely different group of persons than those
who would take by descent from A. The court rejected the defendants' contention
for the application of the doctrine of worthier title which would prevent the
"heirs" from taking as remaindermen by way of purchase. The court said that
in Missouri "heirs" may take as purchasers on the authority of Eckle v. Ryland.:"'
However, Eckle v. Ryland had no relation to the application of the doctrine of
worthier title, but was a case involving the use of the words "or heirs" in the
creation of a contingent remainder, and the issue resolved itself into the question
of whether the words "'or heirs" were used to describe the quality of the estate
of the contingent remainderman, or whether the words were used to create
an alternative contingent remainder in the heirs of the contingent remainder-
man. A holding that a limitation to legal heirs of a remainderman is effective
to create an estate by way of purchase, is no authority that a limitation
to the legal heirs" of a grantor is equally effective to create or transfer an estate
by way of purchase. Eckle v. Ryland can lend no support to the dictum in the
principal case that the doctrine of worthier title is not part of the common law
of Missouri.
The court in the course of its opinion, adopting the language of the annotator
to the case of Akers v. Clark," '; asserted that the reasons for the doctrine being no
longer in existence there would seem to be no justification for the persistence
of American courts in adhering to the doctrine. This dictum leaves us with a
reasonable doubt as to whether the Missouri Supreme Court will by judicial
decision, if the appropriate case arises, repudiate the doctrine as a rule of law,
which defeats intent, and give it the effect only of a rule of construction to be
used in the absence of other intent, or to completely reject the doctrine even as a
rule of construction. In view of the fact that the majority of American courts
accord the doctrine of worthier title the effect of a rule of construction, ,' it is
submitted that the Missouri courts may follow that line of authority and its own
dicta.
However, the well advised lawyer should draw his limitations to carry out
his client's intent on the assumption that the doctrine of worthier title is still a
rule of law in Missouri, in order to avoid the possibility of litigation. Although
the word "heirs" has a fixed legal meaning, it has, nevertheless, been the subject
of judicial construction in numerous suits.9 The obvious difficulty of using a
word of such a polysemantic character should be another reason for lawyers to
avoid its careless use in drawing instruments for their clients. A limitation to
"heirs" as purchasers is usually a thought-saving device to avoid determining
more precisely the ultimate distribution of the property, and every legitimate wish
of a client can be better effectuated by an intelligent lawyer without resorting to
an end limitation to the grantor's or testator's heirs.
SIMON POLSICY
36. 256 Mo. 424, 165 S. W. 1035 (1914).
37. 75 Am. St. Rep. 152, 184 Ill. 136, 56 N. E. 296 (1900).
38. See note 11, supra.
39. Simes, Knouff, Leonard, The Meaning of "Heirs" in Wills-A Suggestion
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ACTS OF GOVERNMENT AS AFFECTING LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP
Not infrequently government regulations cause problems to arise, which as
far as possible should be anticipated in drafting leases, particularly long-term
leases. Many changes in the use of the property may become necessary under
the powers of the state and local authority. Land may be needed for the public
use, the premises may become unsafe or unsanitary, the government may requisi-
tion the use of the premises, under the police power of the state certain restrictions
may be necessary or alterations and improvements may be ordered. Usually the
parties assume the continuation of present conditions and regulations. Many
vexatious problems may be prevented by some consideration of these matters
before the lease is executed. It is proposed to inquire into the effect of such
regulations upon the landlord-tenant relationship.
Condemnation Under Eminent Domain
If all of the leased premises is condemned, Missouri and most of the courts
take the position that the relationship of landlord-tenant is terminated and
the obligation to pay rent suspended.' A few courts hold that the proceeding
has no effect whatever on the obligations under the lease and that the tenant
remains liable for the whole rent.2 Where part of the leased premises is con-
demned by eminent domain proceedings there is a great difference in the holdings
of the cases. Many cases hold that such a proceeding has no effect on the land-
lord-tenant relationship and the tenant remains liable for the whole rent.3 Where
a part of the leased premises is condemned, Missouri has taken the position that
the taking dissolves the relationship of landlord-tenant pro tanto, and the
rent accruing subsequently is reduced in proportion to the amount taken.4
Many other states have adopted the same view either by judicial decisions or
by force of statutes.6
The public, upon condemnation of the land, must pay as compensation the
present value of the property, which is to be distributed between the landlord
1. Stubbings v. Evanston, 136 Ill. 37, 26 N. E. 577 (1891); Corrigan v.
Chicago, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N. E. 746 (1893); Emmes v. Feeley, 132 Mass. 346(1882) ; Devine v. Lord, 175 Mass. 384, 56 N. E. 570 (1900); Goodyear Shoe
Machinery Co. v. Boston Terminal Co., 176 Mass. 115, 57 N. E. 214 (1900);
Savin Hill Yacht Club Ass'n v. Savin Hill Yacht Club, 246 Mass. 75, 140 N. E.
299 (1923); Biddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo. 597 (1856); Barclay v. Pickles, 38 Mo.
143 (1866); Hudson County v. Emmerich, 57 N. 5. Eq. 535, 42 Atl. 107 (1898);
Uhler v. Cowen, 199 Pa. 316, 49 Atl. 77 (1901); Note (1926)- 43 A. L. R. 1176.
2. Foote v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio 408 (1842).
3. See a collection of the cases in (1926) 43 A. L. R. 1176, (1928) 53
A. L. R. 686.
4. Biddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo. 597 (1856); Kingsland v. Clark, 24 Mo. 24
(1856).; Note (1935) 98 A. L. R. 254.
5 Levee Com'rs v. Johnson, 66 1iss. 248, 6 So. 199 (1889); Cuthbert v.
Kuhn, 3 Whart. 357 (Pa. 1838).
6. David v. Beelman, 5 La. Ann. 545 (1850); United Cigar Stores Co. v.
Norwood, 124 Misc. 488, 208 N. Y. Supp. 420 (Sup. Ct. 1925); McCardell v.
Miller, 22 R. I. 96, 46 Atl. 184 (1900).
19401
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and tenant according to their respective interests.7 The effect that the con-
demnation proceeding has upon the landlord-tenant relationship and the tenant's
corresponding obligations under it, will have a very direct bearing upon the
amount of compensation that the parties will receive for the taking of the
property in which both are interested. The measure of compensation for
the tenant's interest where the landlord-tenant relationship is extinguished in all
or part of the property taken, is the reasonable market value of the unex-
pired term of the lease.8 Of course, this is not easy to estimate.?
The practical objection to the view that a taking of part of the leased
premises does not affect the obligations under the lease, an objection which is
applicable with even greater force to the view that a taking of the whole of the
leased premises does not affect such liability, is that, while it results in giving the
tenant a part of the damages for the taking of the premises, on the theory
that he will continue to pay rent to the landlord, it furnishes no security ex-
cepting the personal obligation of the tenant to pay. The result may be that the
tenant, having gotten the fund, part or all of which equitably belongs to the
landlord, as representing future rent payments, may spend it for another pur-
pose, and if the tenant is pecuniarily irresponsible, the landlord is without
any possible remedy.'( It has been suggested, where either a part or the whole
of the leased premises is taken under eminent domain, that the rent should be
either proportionately 'reduced or extinguished for the reason that the lease-
hold interest in the land taken has come to an end by reason of its merger in
the reversion.- If this suggestion were followed, then the danger of the land-
lord losing money which equitably belongs to him by future insolvency of the
tenant, would be eliminated.
However, condemnation of the whole or a part of the leased premises under
the power of eminent domain, and ouster of the tenant as a result thereof,
does not amount to a breach of a covenant in the lease for quiet enjoyment,
for the landlord is in no way at fault in such a taking, so the courts have
not compared this with an eviction either by the landlord, or by one having
a paramount title.12 It is desirable from the position of the landlord and the
tenant to attempt to provide in advance for this contingency so that, so far as
7. Biddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo. 597 (1856); Ellis v. Welch, 6 Mass. 250
(1810).
8. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1875); Biddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo.
597 (1856).
9. See St. Louis v. Senter Commission Co., 108 S. W. (2d) 1070 (Mo.
App. 1937), noted in (1938) 3 Mo. L. REV. 203.
10. 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910) 1185. It was suggested in
the case of Stubbins v. Evanston, 136 Ill. 37, 26 N. E. 577 (1891), that a court
of equity might interpose and appropriate enough of the funds to pay the
rents due and to become due for the duration of the term. But this may be
doubtful even on a showing of insolvency. Moreover, such proceeding could not
determine the continued solvency or insolvency of the tenant during the whole
period of the lease. Ibid.
11. 2 TIFFANY, 10c. cit. supra note 10.
12. Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v. Boston Terminal Co., 176 Mass. 115,
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possible, this situation may be cared for according to their wishes, which may
not coincide with the result under law in the absence of an express arrangement.
Condemnation Because Unsafe or Unsanitary
Condemnation of the leased premises because of unsafe or unsanitary
conditions does not terminate the landlord-tenant relationship, the tenant's
obligation to pay rent continues, 13 and the tenant is not entitled to recover
damages for an eviction. For the tenant to terminate the relationship, outside
of a taking by the public, there must be some fault on the part of the landlord.
The tenant must either be actually put off of the premises or the landlord must
in some manner substantially interfere with the tenant's beneficial enjoyment
of the premises so as to constitute a constructive eviction, which the tenant
could take advantage of by moving off.14 However, if the lease by its express
terms imposes a duty on the landlord to comply with safety and sanitary
regulations, such failure may constitute a constructive eviction, thus relieving
the tenant of further obligations to pay rent.1 5 Of course, before a tenant can
take advantage of an act of the landlord as constituting a constructive eviction
he must first move off of the leased premises. It would be simpler to provide
expressly for this event.
Requisition of Use by the Government
Requisition of the use of the premises by the government does not affect the
landlord-tenant relationship or the tenant's obligation to pay rent, and the tenant
can recover the market value of his tenancy from the government.' 6 The
constitutional grounds for recovery are well stated in Filbin Corp. v. United
States,17 where the court said: "The language of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States is: 'Nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation.' Nothing is said about 'requisition' or
'condemnation;' the word used is 'taken.' The result of either condemnation or
requisition is a taking, and therefore, . . . this amendment applies to the
taking of private property, whether it be by requisition or by condemnation;"
Just compensation guaranteed by the Constitution has been held to be the fair
market value -of the property taken.1S Not infrequently, however, there is
difficulty, because of the character of the property taken, whether realty or
13. Manley v. Bermen, 60 Misc. 91, 111 N. Y. Supp. 711 (Sup. Ct. 1908);
Achlers v. Rehlenger, 1 City Ct. R. 79 (N. Y. 1878); Burns v. Fuchs, 28 Mo.
App. 279 (1887).
14. Fleming v. King, 100 Ga. 449, 28 S. E. 239 (1897).
15. New Chester Theatre Corp. v. Bischoff, 210 App. Div. 125, 205 N. Y.
Supp. 641 (2d Dep't 1924).
16. Gershon Bros. Co. v. United States, 284 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922).
17. 266 Fed. 911 (E. D. S. C. 1920).
18. National City Bank v. United States, 275 Fed. 855 (S. D. N. Y. 1921),
aff'd, 281 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) ; United States v. New River Collieries Co.,
276 Fed. 690 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1921); C. G. Blake Co. v. United States, 275 Fed.
861 (S. D. Ohio 1921), aff'd, 279 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922).
19401
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personalty, to determine the fair market value.' If a building is requisitioned,
the tenant is not entitled to recover, as part of his compensation, moving ex-
penses or allowances for inconvenience incident thereto,-"' and no allowance is
made as part of the "just compensation," for anticipated profits from the per-
formance of a contract,2 but the term has been held to include interest from the
date of the taking where the United States condemns and takes possession of
land before ascertaining or paying compensation.22 But the same objections
apply here as in condemnation, where the relationship is not terminated, and
which the parties may easily eliminate by express provision.
Restrictions of Use by the Police Power of the State
If the use restricted by the police power of the state is not the exclusive
purpose of the lease, so that the tenant may have some beneficial enjoyment of
the premises, notwithstanding one of its uses has been restricted, the courts
are almost unanimous in holding that such a restriction has no effect on the
landlord-tenant relationship and that the tenant is still liable for the rent.2 3 If
the lease restricts the use of the premises to an exclusive purpose (the liquor
business, for example), and that particular use is restricted by the police power
of the state, there is a conflict as to what effect this has on the landlord-tenant
relationship and the tenant's obligation to pay rent. The view adopted by a
court depends on which of two fundamental principles the court adopts. One
theory is that if the performance of a contract is made unlawful after the
contract is entered into, it becomes void and both parties are relieved from
liability under it. Following this principle the landlord-tenant relationship is
terminated and the tenant is relieved from liability, when the use of the
premises is made unlawful.2 4 The other theory is that, in the absence of a
covenant in the lease relieving the tenant from liability, his liability continues
even though the property becomes useless by a casualty over which he had no
19. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 276 Fed. 690 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1921).
20. Gershon Bros. Co. v. United States, 284 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921).
21. De Laval Steam Turbine Co. v. United States, 284 U. !z 61 (1931).
22. Seaboard Air Line Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299 (1923).
23. In re Bradley, 255 Fed. 307 (N. D. Ala. 1915); O'Byrne v. Henley,
161 Ala. 620, 50 So. 83 (1909); Harper v. Young, 123 Ark. 162, 184 S. W. 447
(1916); Burke v. San Francisco Breweries, 21 Cal. App. 198, 131 Pac. 83
(1913); Security Trust & Say. Bank v. Claussen, 44 Cal. App. 735, 187 Pac.
140 (1919); Christopher v. Charles Blum Co., 78 Fla. 240, 82 So. 765 (1919);
Shreveport Ice & Brewing Co. v. Mandel Bros., 128 La. 314, 54 So. 831 (1911);
Standard Brewing Co. v. Weil, 129 Md. 487, 99 Atl. 661 (1916); Robbins v.
McCabe, 239 Iass. 275, 131 N. E. 799 (1921) ; Hyatt v. Grand Rapids Brewing
Co.. 168 Mich. 360, 134 N. W. 22 (1912) ; Proprietors Realty Co. v. Wohltmann,
95 N. J. L. 303, 112 AtI. 410 (1921) ; Miller v. Maguire, 18 R. I. 770, 30 Atl. 966
(1894) ; Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Keenan, 99 Tex. 79, 88 S. W. 197 (1905) ;
Warm Springs Co. v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 58, 165 Pac. 788 (1917); Hecht
v. Acme Coal Co., 19 Wyo. 18, 113 Pac. 788 (1911); Yesler Estate v. Con-
tinential Distributing Co., 99 Wash. 480, 169 Pac. 967 (1918).
24. Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabson, 179 Ala. 444, 60 So. 876 (1912); Kahn v.
Wilhelm, 118 Ark. 239, 177 S. W. 403 (1915); Heart v. East Tennessee Brewing
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control. Following this principle the landlord-tenant relationship and the
tenant's liability for the rent would not be affected by a restriction of the sole
use of the premises by governmental authority. It has been suggested that
the former rule should control because, at the time rules governing the land-
lord-tenant relationship were formulated, social conditions were such that the
right of the tenant received less consideration than those of the landlord, and
that fairness would favor leaning toward the rule which would relieve the
tenant from a situation which he had entered in good faith, when, by reason
of change of laws, the loss must fall somewhere, and there is nothing to suggest
why the landlord should not bear a portion of it.25 This reasoning overlooks the
fact that the essential part of a lease is a conveyance of an interest in land.2 6 The
tenant still has this interest in the land which was conveyed to him by the lease,
even though the -only use for which the land could be used has been restricted,
so it seems that on principles of property law the latter rule should control. This
is another matter which a little foresight in drafting could easily care for.
Alterations and Improvements Ordered
A failure by the landlord to make alterations or repairs required by the
public authorities does not constitute a constructive eviction, where the landlord
is under no duty to make the alterations or repairs because the landlord is in
no way at fault.2 7 Even if the landlord were under a duty to repair, failure to
make repairs and alterations ordered by the authorities would not constitute
constructive eviction because there is no intention to evict and the tenant could
make the repairs and set it off against the rent.2 8 Therefore, the order of repairs
and improvements by the authorities does not affect the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship or the tenant's obligations to pay rent. In the absence of a covenant
to repair or to bear the expense of alterations and improvements ordered by
public authority, the general rule is that the landlord and not the tenant is liable
for the expense of making them. -9 It has been suggested in such situations
that the landlord should be responsible to the public authorities for the condition
of structures which formed part of the property as leased, and, that the tenant
should be responsible for the condition of those thereafter erected by him.3
0
This seems to be a desirable qualification to impose on the general rule and the
courts still have the opportunity to impose it, as the cases on the subject are
concerning structures which formed a part of the premises when leased.
25. Note (1923) 22 A. L. R. 821.
26. 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 159.
27. Pratt v. Grafton Electric Co., 182 Mass. 180, 65 N. E. 63 (1902);
Taylor v. Finnigan, 189 Mass. 568, 76 N. E. 203 (1905); Burns v. Fuchs, 28
Mo. App. 279 (1887).
28. Lohman v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 326 Mo. 842, 33 S. W. (2d) 118
(1930); Griffin v. Fruborn, 181 Mo. App. 203, 168 S. W. 219 (1914); Burns v.
Fuchs, 28 Mo. App. 279 (1887); Note (1931) 45 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 41.
29. Clark v. Gerke, 104 Md. 504, 65 Atl. 326 (1906); Lindwall v. May,
111 App. Div. 457, 97 N. Y. Supp. 821 (2d Dep't 1906); New York v. United
States Trust Co., 116 App. Div. 349, 101 N. Y. Supp. 574 (1st Dep't 1906).
30. 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 620. 12
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A covenant to repair does not oblige the tenant to comply, at his own
expense, with the municipal orders and regulations relating to the alterations
and improvements of a structural nature.' However, if the surrounding cir-
cumstances, coupled with a covenant on the part of the tenant to repair, tend
to show it was the intention of the parties that the expense of making of sub-
stantial alterations was to be borne by the tenant, then the tenant will be liable for
the expense of alterations and improvements ordered by public authorities.3" Un-
der a covenant to repair, the tenant would be liable for repairs and improvements,
not of a structural nature, ordered by governmental authority.3 Obviously,
a tenant covenanting to repair must bear the expense of alterations or improve-
ments ordered by public authority when the requirement is due to some par-
ticular use the tenant is making of the premises.3 4
Under a covenant by the tenant to comply with the requirements of the
public authorities, the landlord and not the tenant is responsible for alterations
and improvements of a structural nature required by the order of a public
authority9 Such a covenant, however, does render the tenant liable for in-
cidental repairs and replacements which may be ordered by the public au-
thorities,6 and also for any alterations or improvements required by the
authorities because of the use the tenant is making of the premises.37 But the
tenant is released from liability under a covenant to repair or a covenant to
comply with the requirements of public authorities where the changes ordered
are a change in municipal policy subsequent to the lease.3 s
These are the more common methods by which governmental regulations
may affect the randrord-tenant relationship. Foresight and careful drafting
31. Getty v. Fitch, 107 Misc. 404, 177 N. Y. Supp. 691 (N. Y. City Cts.
1919); New York v. United States Trust Co., 116 App. Div. 349, 101 N. Y.
Supp. 574 (1st Dep't .1906) ; Lindwall v. May, 111 App. Div. 457, 97 N. Y. Supp.
821 (2d Dep't 1906); Coutant v. Snow, 201 Mo. 527, 100 S. W. 5 (1907); Yall v.
Snow, 201 Mo. 511, 100 S. W. 1 (1906); Zeibig v. Pfeiffer Chemical Co., 150
Mo. App. 482, 131 S. W. 131 (1910).
32. Baker v. Horan, 227 Mass. 415, 116 N. E. 808 (1917); Martinez v.
Thompson, 80 Tex. 568, 16 S. W. 334 (1891); MeManamon v. Tobiason, 75
Wash. 46, 134 Pac. 524 (1913); Note (1924) 33 A. L. R. 530.
33. Harder Realty & Const. Co. v. Lee, 74 Misc. 436, 132 N. Y. Supp. 447
(Sup. Ct. 1911); Clarke v. Yukon Inv. Co., 83 Wash. 485, 145 Pac. 624 (1915).
34. Lumiansky v. Tessier, 213 Mass. 182, 99 N. E. 1051 (1912); Johnson
v. Snow, 102 Mo. App. 233, 76 S. W. 675 (1903), rev'd on other grounds in 201
Mo. 450, 100 S. W. 5 (1907); Pross v. Excelsior Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 1.0
Misc. 195, 179 N. Y. Supp. 176 (N. Y. City Cts. 1920).
35. Zeibig v. Pfeiffer Chemical- Co., 150 Mo. App. 482, 131 S. W. 131 (1910).
Holden v. O'Brien, 204 N. Y. Supp. 340 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Morrissy v. Rhinelander
Real Estate Co., 158 App. Div. 533, 143 N. Y. Supp. 826 (1st Dep't 1913);
Clarke v. Yukon Inv. Co., 83 Wash. 485, 145 Pac. 624 (1915).
36. Des Moines Steel Co. v. Hawkeye Amusement Co., 187 Iowa 940, 174
N. W. 703 (1919); Markham v. Stevenson Brewing Co., 104 App. Div. 420,
93 N. Y. Supp. 684 (1st Dep't 1905).
37. Blauner v. Siegel, 85 Misc. 398, 147 N. Y. Supp. 435 (Sup. Ct. 1914);
Federal Estates Corp. v. Lucca Restaurant Co., 184 N. Y. Supp. 679 (Sup. Ct.
1920); Clarke v. Yukon Inv. Co., 83 Wash. 485, 145 Pac. 624 (1915).
38. Johnson v. Snow, 102 Mo. App. 233, 76 S. W. 675 (1903), rev'd on other
grounds in 201 Mo. 450, 100 S. W. 5 (1907) ; Herald Square Realty Co. v. Saks
& Co., 215 N. Y. 427, 109 N. E. 545 (1915); Blanchard Co. v. Rome Metalic
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of provisions in the lease to care for these possibilities are necessary adequately
to protect the parties. This is one place in the law where the whole approach
in entering into the relationship should be of a preventive character. This
is due to the historical aspect of the relationship which results in two or more
persons being interested in the same land at the same time, yet not in the
form of co-ownership. Had the relationship a basis in contract, perhaps more
attention would have been paid to drafting.
HARRY H. BOCK
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